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Introduction 
1. The accurate measurement and control of public 
expenditure is fundamental to successful government: it is 
essential at each of the stages of policy development, 
implementation, and monitoring. This paper is concerned 
with issues in the measurement of public expenditure in the 
post-devolution United Kingdom: in particular, we provide a 
constructive critique of the expenditure data currently 
published by the Treasury. 
 
2. Our study is based on two regular exercises carried out 
by the Treasury: 
 
a. the publication of the annual Public Expenditure 
Statistical Analyses (PESA), which contains an analysis of 
public expenditure attributable to the countries/regions of 
the UK. This attributable expenditure is known as 
identifiable: the remainder, (with minor exceptions), is 
known as non-identifiable. 
 
b. the publication of the biennial Treasury Funding 
Statement for the Devolved Administrations (TFS), which 
sets out the procedures used in setting the budgets for the 
devolved administrations of the UK. 
 
3. The starting point for this study was information obtained 
by the authors under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act: 
namely, the fully detailed data base which underpins the 
PESA country/regional expenditure tables. 
 
Access to this detailed data transforms the potential for 
analysing and understanding the published public 
expenditure figures, and also the operation of devolution. It 
is now possible to check, at individual sub-programme level, 
whether the classifications used in PESA are consistent with 
the split between devolved and reserved responsibilities in 
the TFS: in fact, in important respects, they are not 
consistent. Moreover, it is now possible to gain an 
understanding of exactly what expenditure is included in 
particular published PESA aggregates: the results of this are 
sometimes surprising. 
 
4. The structure of the paper is as follows: 
Section 1 gives background on PESA and TFS, and outlines 
the basic approach used in the current study. 
 
Section 2 considers the treatment of expenditure which is on 
devolved functions and which is not identifiable in PESA. 
We show that there is a significant error in one of the key 
PESA statistics: at least £4.4 billion of expenditure on 
certain services in England is treated as non-identifiable, 
while expenditure on the corresponding services in Scotland 
is treated as identifiable: this affects the comparison of 
identifiable expenditure between the two countries. 
 
Section 3 considers expenditure on devolved functions 
which is identifiable in PESA. One of our findings is that 
there is an asymmetry between Scotland and England in the 
way certain of these services are handled in PESA, which 
again affects the identifiable expenditure comparison 
between the two countries, though the effects of this error 
will be relatively small. 
 
Section 4 considers reserved functions. It is shown that 
there are areas of ambiguity, and some apparent mistakes, 
in the way certain expenditure is classified in PESA. 
 
Section 5 outlines the benefits of publishing considerably 
more of the detailed information underlying PESA than has 
been the practice to date. 
 
Section 6 identifies the implications of our findings for the 
annual Government Expenditure and Revenues in Scotland 
(GERS) exercise carried out by the Scottish Executive. 
 
Section 7 contains our conclusions and recommendations: 
these include detailed suggestions for improvements which 
are required in the conduct of the PESA and TFS exercises, 
and for the publication of data. 
 
Section 1: Background on the Public Expenditure 
Statistical Analyses and the Treasury Funding 
Statement. 
 
The Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 
1.1  PESA, (Treasury, 2005), is the primary source of 
outturn data on public expenditure  in the UK. The country 
and regional analysis, (CRA), section shows public 
expenditure  identifiable to Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and also the English regions. As the Treasury itself 
says of the CRA, “These National Statistics are widely used 
as the main source of regional spending data by analysts 
inside and outside Government.” (ref: Treasury Guidance.) 
 
1.2 The definition of identifiable expenditure is given in para 
8.13  of PESA as 
 
“that which can be recognised as having been incurred for 
the benefit of individuals, enterprises or communities within 
particular regions”, 
 
while non-identifiable expenditure is 
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“that which is deemed to be incurred on behalf of the UK as 
a whole: e.g., defence expenditure.” 
 
The basic principle, therefore, is that expenditure should be 
allocated to a country/region on the basis of who benefits 
from the relevant service, rather than on the basis of the 
location where the relevant service is provided. 
 
1.3 The CRA data is based on an annual Treasury exercise 
carried out with Whitehall Departments, in which 
departments split each of the identifiable sub-programmes 
by country/English region. The Treasury combines this data 
with those relating to the devolved administrations, and local 
authorities, to produce the CRA analysis. 
 
1.4  We note here two points from the guidance issued to 
departments on how to allocate identifiable expenditure, 
(ref: Treasury Guidance): 
 
a. All transfer payments, (including current grants and 
subsidies to companies), are regarded as identifiable, on the 
basis of the residence or location of the grant recipient. 
(para 32 of guidance). 
 
b. Spending on collective services by central government 
bodies is only regarded as identifiable where services are 
delivered at a regional or local level, and are mostly for 
the benefit of a regional or local community: (page 8 of 
guidance). 
 
1.5 The data set used here, obtained under the FOI Act, is 
consistent with the aggregate figures published in the CRA 
of PESA 2005. It consists of data for 2003-04 expenditure 
by central government and public corporations, cross- 
classified by department (of which there are 49): 
expenditure function (18 categories): sub-function (59 
categories): sub-programme (796 categories): whether 
capital or current: whether identifiable or non-identifiable: 
and, if identifiable, by country/region of England (13 
categories). 
 
 
Treasury Funding Statements  (TFS) 
1.6  Every two years, the Treasury produces a statement on 
the funding of the devolved administrations. “The purpose of 
this statement is to set out the policies and procedures 
which underpin the exercise of setting the budgets for the 
devolved administrations, and to inform those inside 
government and outside how the funding process operates.” 
(Treasury, 2004). The TFS is the only detailed source 
showing which sub-programmes are reserved and which 
devolved. 
 
1.7 The TFS also sets out for each sub-programme within 
each relevant Whitehall Department, information on whether 
or not the function relating to that sub-programme is 
devolved to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland, or is 
reserved. 
Bringing the CRA and TFS data together 
1.8 Technically, it should be possible to consider each item 
of expenditure as being cross classified by whether it is 
identifiable or non-identifiable in PESA: and whether the 
corresponding function has been classed as reserved or 
devolved in the TFS. Such an exercise would give a 
classification of expenditure, as set out in the following 
diagram: 
 
 
 
Non-Identifiable  Identifiable Devolved                                                     
A                                        B Reserved                                                        
C                                          D 
 
 
 
 
In fact, it is not possible to carry out a complete 
reconciliation, because the sub-programme breakdowns 
used in the two Treasury sources are not wholly consistent. 
Nevertheless, much that is of considerable interest does 
emerge from even the partial reconciliation that is possible. 
The following three sections discuss expenditure falling in 
cell A, cell B, and cells C and D respectively. 
 
 
Section 2: Expenditure on devolved functions 
which is non-identifiable  in PESA: (Cell A above) 
2.1  All Scottish Executive expenditure is regarded by the 
Treasury as identifiable. One might expect, therefore, that 
expenditure on the same services undertaken by Whitehall 
departments in England would be identifiable in the PESA 
database. However, comparison of the detailed PESA data 
with the TFS for 2002 and 2004 indicates that there are at 
least 82 expenditure cells, accounting for almost £4.4 billion 
of expenditure in England, where this expenditure is classed 
as non-identifiable in PESA, but where the corresponding 
functions in Scotland are devolved (and therefore 
identifiable). 
 
2.2 The main departments where this occurs, and the 
corresponding amounts of expenditure falling into this 
category, are shown in the following table. 
 
 
Expenditure on devolved functions which is non-identifiable 
in PESA: 2003-04 £ million 
 
 
 
Home Office 2,758 
DEFRA 500 
Constitutional Affairs 491 
Office of Deputy Prime Minister 375 
Other Departments 273 
Total 4,397 
 
For each department, the main functions contributing to the 
above table are:- 
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Home Office: operation of the prison system in England. 
DEFRA: functions such as English Nature and the 
Countryside Commission, along with a large number of 
environmental protection measures. 
Department for Constitutional Affairs: the Court Service 
Agency and judicial salaries for England. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: the Valuation Office 
Agency, Central admin., and non-domestic rate collection 
for England. 
 
2.3  Para 8.17 of PESA 2005 states that “figures for 
expenditure per head in the regions of England and the 
countries of the UK are therefore directly comparable.” This 
statement is contradicted by the fact that, as we have just 
seen, at least £4.4 billion of expenditure in England on 
functions which are devolved to Scotland is excluded from 
the basis of identifiable expenditure in England, while 
expenditure on the same functions in Scotland is included in 
identifiable expenditure in Scotland. This means that the 
comparison of identifiable expenditure between Scotland 
and England is not on a like for like basis, with identifiable 
expenditure in England being understated by at least 1.45% 
relative to the expenditure base used to describe identifiable 
expenditure in Scotland. 
 
2.4 This problem has arisen because PESA is intended to 
fulfil the functions of providing both (a) English regional 
comparisons and (b) country comparisons such as between 
England and Scotland. As it is impossible to identify English 
expenditure on some functions to the regions, the basis of 
comparison between English regions is different from that 
between England and Scotland. The present formulation of 
PESA, embodying a single concept of identifiable 
expenditure, is therefore too simplistic to enable both of 
these functions to be accomplished without error. In the next 
paragraph we outline the change which requires to be made 
in PESA to correct the problem. 
 
2.5 The services listed at the end of para 2.2 would 
normally be regarded as general collective services for the 
whole of England: but since they have Scottish 
counterparts, they are not collective for the whole of the UK. 
As noted above in para 1.4b, the Treasury guidance on 
PESA classifies general collective services as non- 
identifiable. On this basis, the services in question would 
reasonably be classified as non-identifiable for regions 
within England, but identifiable between the countries of the 
UK. However, the CRA survey and database only have one 
category for non-identifiable, meaning non-identifiable for all 
countries/regions of the UK. 
 
It would appear therefore, that what requires to be done to 
correct the error is to introduce a new “non-identifiable in 
England” category into PESA: and when making public 
expenditure  comparisons comparing Scotland and England, 
to add the “ non-identifiable in England” category to 
identifiable in England to put the comparison on the same 
basis as identifiable in Scotland. 
3. Identifiable expenditure  on devolved services 
(Cell B) 
3.1 The Scottish Executive accounted for some £14,281m 
of identifiable expenditure in Scotland on devolved services 
in 2003-04. In addition, £168m of expenditure by Whitehall 
departments was identified to Scotland in 2003-04 on 
services which are devolved to Scotland. This expenditure is 
spread over some 7 departments and some 50 or so 
individual sub-programme cells of expenditure. 
 
3.2 This £168 million comprises expenditure of three main 
types. 
 
a.  where a Whitehall department is administering a 
devolved service for Scotland effectively as an agent of the 
Scottish Executive. 
 
b.  where, in the course of administering a devolved service 
for England, nevertheless some of the resulting expenditure 
can be validly attributed as benefiting Scotland under the 
rules of PESA. 
 
c. where the attribution of expenditure to Scotland appears 
questionable. 
 
3.3  Examples of the first category are: 
 
a. expenditure undertaken by the now defunct Strategic Rail 
Authority on the franchising of rail operators. Rail franchising 
is a devolved service to the Scottish Executive: but this 
function was administered by the SRA acting in consultation 
with Scottish Executive Ministers. In 2003-04, SRA 
expenditure attributed to Scotland under this head was just 
over £30 million. 
 
b. expenditure by the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Agency: the CICA, which is listed in PESA under the Home 
Office, administers criminal injuries compensation for the 
whole of Great Britain, and is funded jointly by the Home 
Office and the Scottish Executive: the amount of 
expenditure identifiable to Scotland is £33m. 
 
3.4 The second category of expenditure in para 3.2 arises 
where a Whitehall department is administering a devolved 
service in England, but where some of the beneficiaries can 
nevertheless be identified as being resident in Scotland. 
This could occur, for example, (a) where Scottish residents 
visit a national museum or gallery in England:  (b) where 
recipients of certain public sector pension schemes such as 
for NHS (England) employees or for teachers in England, 
decide to retire to Scotland. 
 
3.5  Given the “who benefits from the service” definition of 
identifiable expenditure in PESA, it appears quite 
reasonable that elements of English provision in cases like 
the above should be attributed to Scotland. However, there 
is a resulting asymmetry of treatment between Scotland and 
England. Scotland, from its devolved budget, funds national 
  50 
 
 
museums and galleries and runs public sector pension 
schemes for teachers and NHS employees. Some of the 
beneficiaries of these Scottish services will be resident in 
England, but all Scottish expenditure on these services is 
attributable to Scotland in PESA. This asymmetry 
represents another distortion to the comparison of 
identifiable expenditure between Scotland and England. The 
effect will not be particularly large, given, for example, that 
expenditure by DCMS on Museums and Galleries 
attributable to Scotland amounts to just over £5million, and 
by DfES on teachers’ pensions attributable to Scotland 
amounts to £19.8m. Nevertheless, it would be desirable if 
the anomaly were corrected in PESA. 
 
3.6 The third category distinguished in para 3.2 is where 
the attribution of devolved expenditure to Scotland by a 
Whitehall department appears questionable. To give two 
examples: 
 
a. The Department of Works and Pensions attributes £59.6 
million of European expenditure to Scotland in 2003-04, 
comprising £7m payments under European Social Fund 
(ESF), £50.2m Payments in Advance under ESF, and 
£2.4m under ERDF. However, both ESF and ERDF are 
devolved to Scotland and the Scottish Executive PESA 
figures contain £47m for ESF and £98m for ERDF. The 
DWP attribution to Scotland appears highly questionable. 
 
b. Again, under DWP, £4.2m is attributable to Scotland for 
administration of the Rent service - a purely English service. 
This too appears highly questionable. 
 
We pointed out these questions to the Treasury: following 
the submission of the original text of this paper, they have 
come back to us confirming that the attribution of these 
payments to Scotland was incorrect. 
 
3.7   Finally, it is worth concluding this section by noting 
another more intangible benefit of detailed scrutiny at sub- 
programme level: namely, an enhanced appreciation of the 
very concept of “identifiable expenditure”. There is perhaps 
a tendency to think about identifiable expenditure in terms of 
the large programmes such as health and education. It is 
salutary to be reminded that tucked away in the figures are 
also elements like usage by Scottish residents of national 
galleries and museums in England, or the pensions paid to 
certain public sector pensioners who have relocated to 
Scotland. 
 
 
Section 4: Reserved functions (Cells C and D) 
4.1 The decision as to whether reserved expenditure 
should be regarded as identifiable or non-identifiable 
appears to be governed in most cases by the two principles 
which were outlined in para 1.4 above. However, for some 
categories of reserved expenditure, the decision is by no 
means clear cut. The specific example which probably best 
illustrates the problem is the grant payments made by the 
DTI to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 
(UKAEA): these payments are regarded in PESA as 
identifiable. In 2003/04, DTI provided £260.5m to the 
UKAEA for decommissioning, of which £111.8m (42.9%) 
was identifiable to Scotland: and £58.4m in grant-in-aid, of 
which £25m (42.8%) was identifiable to Scotland. 
 
4.2  Presumably the UKAEA payments are regarded as 
identifiable in PESA because of the principle that grants to 
undertakings are identifiable. However, the service being 
provided by the UKAEA is a collective service for the UK as 
a whole: it is clearly in the interest of, and the responsibility 
of, the UK as a whole to see that its nuclear programme is 
safely tidied up. Scotland indeed benefits from the resulting 
multiplier effects, given that a substantial amount of the 
resulting expenditure is actually incurred here: but the 
fundamental principle in PESA is meant to be attribution on 
the basis of who benefits from the service, not who benefits 
from any multiplier effects of the cost of providing the 
service. On this basis, we argue that UKAEA expenditure 
should be treated as a collective service and hence 
regarded as non-identifiable in PESA. 
 
4.3 The UKAEA represents only one, (if, admittedly, a fairly 
clear cut), example where there could be legitimate debate 
about the allocation of reserved services between identified 
and non-identified in PESA. In fact, there is a whole 
spectrum of transfer payments and grants, ranging from 
pure provision of services at one end, to provision of what is 
clearly a collective service at the other, with, in the middle, a 
considerable grey area which could be argued either way. 
Consider, for example, grants made by the research 
councils to fund scientific research. These are reserved, are 
identifiable in PESA, and are allocated by location of 
recipient research establishment. Clearly, they also serve a 
collective UK purpose- to develop the science base of the 
UK as a whole. But also, clearly, the receipt of a research 
council grant confers a tangible benefit on the recipient 
university- conferring prestige, and improving future 
prospects. The recipient universities are much more than 
mere agents spending the grant funding. On this basis, the 
decision to identify research council grants in PESA seems, 
on balance, entirely reasonable. 
 
4.4 The substantive point we take away from this 
discussion is that some of the decisions as to whether 
reserved expenditure should be identified or not are 
genuinely difficult, and raise complications which go beyond 
the principles laid down in the current PESA guidance. 
There is potential ambiguity, particularly in relation to 
transfer payments and grants, between the “who benefits” 
and “location” principles for allocating expenditure to 
countries/regions. We recommend that the Treasury should 
improve the guidance it publishes in this area. 
 
4.5  We now turn to another problem which arises with 
respect to reserved expenditure: this occurs where a 
Whitehall department has mixed responsibilities, covering 
provision of reserved services for the whole of the UK, while 
at the same time providing other services for England only. 
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The first example like this which we consider is activity by 
the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, (DCMS), in the 
field of tourism. 
 
4.6 The DCMS is responsible, through VisitBritain, for 
promoting tourism overseas for Britain as a whole: it also 
has responsibility for promoting tourism locally within 
England, (the English Tourism Council (ETC) was 
subsumed into VisitBritain), and as part of this provides 
some of the funding for the English Regional Tourist Boards 
through grants. Surprisingly, despite this mix of British and 
specifically English responsibilities, all these DCMS 
functions are classed as reserved in the TFS. 
 
From the detailed PESA database, it can be seen that of the 
total of £61.5 million expenditure in 2003/04, only £5.549 
million is actually identified, a sum which is attributed to the 
English regions, and consists of the grants paid by 
VisitBritain to the English RTBs. This raises two important 
issues. 
 
 
a) A significant part of DCMS activities on tourism relates to 
England, (namely, distribution of grant to RTBs in England, 
and the functions of the ETC subsumed in VisitBritain),  with 
no parallel activities being undertaken by DCMS in 
Scotland. The classification of the DCMS expenditure on 
tourism in the TFS as reserved therefore looks wrong. This 
should be re-visited. Otherwise the effect is that Scotland is 
excluded from any Barnett consequences of the DCMS 
comparable activity of promoting tourism locally in England. 
 
 
b) Whether or not the reserved/devolved status of DCMS 
tourism activity is revised, the identifiable/non-identifiable 
split of DCMS tourism expenditure is clearly wrong. The only 
expenditure which is identifiable to England is the £5.5m 
grant distribution to the RTBs. But for the remaining DCMS 
expenditure, there is evidence to suggest that a substantial 
component is expenditure purely or primarily for England. 
(For example in 2002/03, DCMS paid grants of £16.2m to 
the ETC and Greater London Authority - with no 
corresponding Scottish grant payments. Also relevant is the 
evidence quoted in Cuthbert and Cuthbert, (2002), to the 
effect that certain other key DCMS activities are slanted 
primarily towards England.) The identifiable/non-identifiable 
status of DCMS expenditure on tourism requires to be re- 
examined, taking into account a proper assessment of who 
actually benefits, and of the effort put in with respect to the 
different parts of Britain. 
 
 
4.7  Exactly similar issues arise in our second example, with 
respect to support for export promotion and inward 
investment: these are reserved functions handled by UK 
Trade and Investment, and the PESA database records 
respectively £34.9m for DTI admin.: £21m for inward 
investment: and £75m for trade development. 
The first of these categories is identifiable in PESA with 
£2.89m (8.3%) attributed to Scotland, which is close to 
Scotland’s population share. However, according to the UK 
Trade and International finance department (see Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert, 2002), in 2002/03, £15.4m of expenditure 
under this head related purely to England, with no 
comparable spend for Scotland. So the wholly reserved 
classification of this category in TFS, and the identifiable to 
Scotland figure in PESA, both look suspect. 
 
The other two categories, of inward investment and trade 
development, are not identifiable in PESA. However, in 
2002/03, £12.9m of the inward investment spend was for 
grants to the English Regional Development Agencies, 
(RDAs), with no corresponding Scottish spend. So again, 
the wholly reserved classification of this category in PESA 
looks wrong, and at least the £12.9m should have been 
identified in PESA to England. 
 
4.8 There is a general lesson to be learned from these two 
examples. If care had been taken to ensure that the PESA 
and TFS classifications were consistent, and if the 
reserved/devolved, and identifiable/non-identifiable status of 
each resulting cell of expenditure had been published, then 
it would have been obvious, (even at the stage of compiling 
the data), that the way in which the money was actually 
being spent was inconsistent with the TFS classification of 
all these functions as reserved.  If so, not merely would 
better data have resulted, but it is probable that a better 
service for all parts of the UK would have resulted as well. 
Alternatively, if the Department continued to exercise some 
purely local English functions, then the relevant expenditure 
should be reclassified as devolved in the TFS. 
 
 
 
Section 5 Further benefits of access to enhanced 
PESA data 
5.1 This section considers two further potential benefits 
from the ability to access enhanced and detailed PESA 
information. First, is the opportunity to look below the main 
expenditure headings to see what is actually happening at 
micro level. Second, at a more aggregate level, there is the 
potential to fill an important gap in our understanding of the 
effects of devolution itself. 
 
 
5.2 To illustrate the first advantage we consider two 
particular areas: employment, and enterprise. 
 
 
5.3  PESA (Table 8.11) implies that expenditure per head on 
employment policies in 2003-04 was £148 per head in 
Scotland relative to £55 in the UK. This difference appears 
to suggest a much greater focus in Scotland on improving 
employment opportunities. The detail of employment 
expenditure for Scotland taken from the PESA database is 
shown below. 
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Spending Agency  £m 
Scottish Executive: 
 Scottish Enterprise 461.4 
 ESF 47.3 
 Careers Service 0.2 
DWP  394.9 
Other  9.1 
Total  912.9 
 
HIE £95.5m 
ERDF £98m 
RSA £40.3m 
Promotion of Tourism £36.2m 
Central and misc. £19.5m 
Electricity £12.3m 
Other £  5.2m 
Total £307m 
 
5.6  Our second example is the PESA data on Enterprise 
and Economic Development. Identifiable expenditure on this 
function in Scotland is £550m, comprising Scottish 
Executive £307m, UK Departments (mainly DTI) £154m, 
and Local Authorities £89m, (Table 8.17 of PESA 2005). 
The PESA database, however, reveals the following 
features: 
 
a. the composition of the Scottish Executive figure is as 
follows 
 
 
 
5.4  When we examined this breakdown, the following errors 
in the data became apparent. 
 
a. The figure for Scottish Enterprise (SE) represents all of 
SE expenditure including spend on enterprise as well as 
employment. 
 
b. The figures exclude Highlands and Islands Enterprise 
(HIE) spend on employment, which is included under 
enterprise. 
 
Correcting these errors would mean replacing the figure of 
£461.4m in the above table by £176m, (which is the SE and 
HIE combined spend on skills and employment). Note that 
these errors, which are readily detectable once the detailed 
data is available, are virtually undetectable from the 
published aggregate figures alone. The effect is to reduce 
the spend on employment in Scotland to £628m, or £102 
per head. 
 
We informed the Treasury of the misallocation of SE and 
HIE expenditure in PESA: their response was that they 
would include both Scottish Enterprise and HIE under 
Enterprise as from PESA 2006. Since, as we have seen, 
these bodies have responsibility for both employment and 
enterprise functions, this is not a satisfactory response. 
 
5.5  In addition, the detailed information in the PESA 
database also tells us much that is interesting about the 
nature of expenditure on employment. No less than £190m 
of the £394.9 million DWP spend on employment is DWP 
administration. In fact, it appears from the DWP Annual 
Report, (2005), that almost all the administration costs for 
those of working age have wrongly been attributed to the 
employment function, so the £190m figure should be 
significantly reduced. (This mistake occurs for all parts of 
the UK so it does not affect country/region comparisons.) In 
addition, note that £98.3m of the DWP spend is on 
restructuring: that is, internal DWP spend on improving their 
service. While this is validly included under employment, the 
implication of the large administration and restructuring 
component is that the amount spent on frontline 
employment policies in Scotland is quite small and probably 
only £55 per head. This is just over a third of the headline 
PESA figure of £148 per head. 
 
This table mistakenly includes all HIE expenditure but omits 
all that of Scottish Enterprise: this is the other side of the 
error we noted in para 5.4 above. To correct this, the figure 
of £307m should increase by £284.5m. 
 
b. Under DTI are items like £69.4m for ring fenced coal 
health liabilities, and £34.8m for the Post Office. While no 
doubt correctly attributable to Enterprise and Economic 
Development in a technical sense, these nevertheless do 
not spring obviously to mind as mainstream constituents of 
this function. The same can also be said of Electricity and 
Central and Misc. in the Scottish Executive table above. 
Overall, the message is that without examining the detail, 
there is no indication in the PESA aggregate figures either 
as to the serious error in the overall total figure for 
Enterprise and Economic Development, or of the actual 
nature of significant elements of the expenditure being 
undertaken. Without this detail, wrong conclusions could 
easily be made as to the effectiveness and value for money 
of spend on employment and enterprise policies. 
 
5.7  Our findings in the previous two examples are relevant 
to the study carried out by Wood, (2005), for the Scottish 
Parliament Finance Committee. Wood’s study concluded 
that there was a lack of evidence that spending on public 
services had been influenced by economic development 
priorities. This conclusion was based on examination of 
Scottish Executive budget figures: the Wood study used the 
published PESA aggregate figures for spend on enterprise 
and employment in Scotland by Whitehall departments. Had 
it been able to examine the detail in the PESA database 
underlying the figures on Whitehall spend in Scotland on 
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enterprise and employment, it would have been able to draw 
even stronger conclusions. 
 
5.8  Our final example in this section deals with an 
aggregate-level advantage of enhancing the basic PESA 
data set. One of the most interesting features of devolution 
should be to observe how patterns of expenditure in the 
different countries diverge, reflecting differing and changing 
priorities in the constituent countries of the UK. It is a 
remarkable gap in current data sources that there is no 
published analysis that adequately illustrates this. The 
published PESA data for the Scottish Executive and Welsh 
Assembly do indeed show (with some very minor 
exceptions) how spending on devolved services is split by 
function in these two countries. The problem is that, for 
England, the PESA database contains only information on 
whether expenditure is identifiable or not: it does not show 
devolved/ reserved status. So all that can be produced from 
PESA are analyses of identifiable expenditure for England: 
which is quite different from an analysis of expenditure on 
services which are devolved. 
 
This gap could easily be filled if, as we recommend, the 
Treasury aligned the sub-programme classifications used in 
PESA and TFS: and recorded in each annual PESA 
database both the identifiability and reserved/devolved 
status of each cell of expenditure. 
 
5.9  In practice, the procedure would be slightly more 
complicated than this, since: 
 
a. There might be a need for a small increase in the number 
of expenditure cells, since some PESA cells would need to 
be split if they currently contain a mix of devolved and 
reserved responsibilities. 
 
b. There are some differences in the mix of services 
devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: so a 
slightly more complicated coding structure would be 
required to describe devolution status, rather than a simple 
binary distinction between devolved and reserved. 
These, however, are relatively minor complications 
compared to the potential benefits from the proposed 
change. Together they could result in a more accurate TFS, 
improved data quality in PESA, and analyses showing a 
proper comparison of the patterns of spend on devolved 
services in Scotland, (or Wales, or Northern Ireland), in 
comparison with the same services in England. 
 
 
6. Implications for GERS 
6.1 The Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland 
(GERS), (Scottish Executive, 2004), has been produced 
annually by the Scottish Executive (previously the Scottish 
Office) since 1992. GERS is intended “to enhance public 
understanding of fiscal issues in Scotland”, and gives an 
estimate of the balance between government revenues and 
expenditures in Scotland. Note that for the purposes of 
GERS, Scotland is defined to exclude the North Sea, so 
North Sea revenues are excluded. On the expenditure side, 
the intention is to capture all of the general expenditures of 
government attributable to Scotland: this is a much broader 
concept than PESA identifiable expenditure. We published 
in 1998 a critique of technical and philosophical aspects of 
GERS, (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 1998): much of that paper is 
still relevant. 
 
6.2  On the expenditure side, GERS is fundamentally based 
on PESA. To the PESA estimate of identifiable expenditure 
for Scotland is added a share of non-identifiable UK 
expenditure and also a share of any government 
expenditure which has been identified in PESA to “outside 
UK”. Non-identifiable and outside-UK expenditure are 
apportioned to Scotland using factors like Scotland’s 
population share of the total UK population. 
 
6.3  Our findings in the earlier sections of this paper have 
immediate implications for GERS. Some of these findings 
mean that there are clear or likely errors in GERS: for 
example, 
 
a. In section 2, we identified at least £4.4billion of 
expenditure in England which was non-identifiable within 
England but was classed in PESA as generally non- 
identifiable within the UK. The attribution in the GERS 
methodology of Scotland’s population share (8.5%) of non- 
identifiable expenditure to Scotland would mean that at least 
£370 million of English expenditure would be wrongly 
attributed to Scotland. 
 
b. In section 3, we identified over £63m on ESF and the 
Rent Agency whose attribution to Scotland in PESA is 
incorrect. 
 
c. In section 4, we questioned the attribution to Scotland of 
£136.8m of UKAEA expenditure. 
 
d. In section 3, we identified an asymmetry in the way 
certain services were identified between Scotland and 
England, which results in identifiable expenditure in 
Scotland being somewhat overstated relative to England. 
The net effect of these items alone is that the GERS 
methodology, if applied to the 2003-04 data, would 
overstate general government expenditure in Scotland by 
over £500m. 
 
Note that the last published GERS relates to 2002-03, while 
we have the detailed PESA data only for 2003-04. However, 
it is clear from comparison of the published PESA figures for 
2002-03 and 2003-04 that the same mistakes were made in 
PESA in these two years. So the published GERS figures 
for 2002-03 are in error because of the above points by 
about the same order of magnitude. 
 
6.4  We argued in section 4, there needs to be a more 
general exercise conducted in PESA, examining in much 
greater detail the identifiable / non-identifiable status of 
expenditure on reserved functions. Further, we have not 
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been able to completely reconcile the inconsistent sub- 
programme classifications used in PESA and the TFS: 
hence we are not confident that we have identified all of the 
significant errors in PESA. 
 
The implication, therefore, is that our work in this paper has 
established that there are significant errors and question 
marks in PESA which impact on GERS: that the effect of the 
errors identified so far on GERS is that Scottish expenditure 
is overstated by around £500m. There is, however, further 
work to be done, and PESA will not provide an adequate 
platform upon which to build a GERS exercise until the 
reforms which we are advocating for PESA have been 
undertaken. 
The fact that past GERS exercises have been conducted 
without detecting the kind of problems with the underlying 
PESA data which have been identified here, points to a 
failure in the Scottish Executive to adequately check the 
source data. 
 
6.5  In addition, we recommend that the Scottish Executive 
should publish much more detailed information as part of 
any future GERS exercise. Specifically, for each non- 
identifiable or outwith-UK cell of expenditure, the Scottish 
Executive should publish reserved/devolved status, exactly 
what factors they have used in apportioning the expenditure 
to Scotland in GERS, and how much expenditure has been 
apportioned as a result. This detail would greatly add to 
general understanding of exactly what is being attributed to 
Scotland by GERS. 
 
To give one example, consider the Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link. This Department of Transport function is reserved, and 
is identifiable expenditure in PESA. In 2003-04, of the 
£223.6m expenditure within the UK, less than 0.5% is 
identifiable to Scotland, equivalent to just over £1m. 
However, a substantial amount of the expenditure on the 
channel tunnel rail link is classed in PESA as outwith-UK 
(£166m). Given the GERS methodology, 8.5% of this 
outwith-UK expenditure would be attributed to Scotland – 
amounting to £14.1m. Clearly, there is, to say the least, 
room for debate as to whether Scotland should be attributed 
with 8.5% of outside UK expenditure, but less than 0.5% of 
within UK expenditure on this function. 
This is the type of issue which would immediately become 
apparent if the detailed data we are recommending was 
published each year with any future GERS. 
 
 
Section 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1  In this article we have uncovered significant 
weaknesses in the country and regional analysis as 
currently conducted: (given that our study has not been 
comprehensive, there may well be others). We list below 
detailed recommendations which would remedy these 
weaknesses. The effect of implementing these 
recommendations would, however, go further than 
improving the utility and quality of the data in PESA, and the 
accuracy of the TFS. As we have seen, (from the tourism 
and enterprise examples discussed in section 4), a degree 
of mismatch can occur between the description in TFS of 
what the devolved/reserved responsibilities of a department 
ought to be, and what the department actually does. In 
these circumstances, the actual quality of service delivery is 
likely to be compromised. Hence implementing the 
recommendations outlined below is likely to lead to an 
actual improvement in the quality of service itself. 
 
7.2  Our detailed recommendations are: 
 
i. the Treasury should align the sub-programmes used in the 
PESA and TFS exercises, and the reserved/devolved status 
of each expenditure cell should be recorded in the PESA 
database. 
ii. The lack of a “non-identifiable within England” category of 
expenditure in PESA should be rectified. 
 
iii. The asymmetry for certain functions in the attribution of 
devolved identified expenditure as between England and the 
devolved administrations should be corrected. 
 
iv. Improved guidance should be issued on the attribution of 
identifiable expenditure in PESA. 
 
v. The Treasury should produce and publish detailed 
expenditure data at department/sub-programme level, 
showing for each item of expenditure whether the function is 
reserved or devolved, as in the Treasury Funding 
Statement: whether it is identifiable or non-identifiable in 
PESA terms, and, if identifiable, the country/regional split of 
the expenditure. 
 
vi. The Treasury should use the devolved/reserved code 
included in the enhanced PESA database to produce and 
publish analyses of expenditure on devolved services, split 
down by function, on a comparable basis for all countries of 
the UK. 
 
vii. As regards the Scottish Executive, it should pay greater 
attention to checking the quality of source data for any 
GERS type exercise: if it continues with the annual GERS 
exercise, it should publish for each non-identifiable sub- 
programme, (as published at (v)), the basis of 
apportionment to Scotland used in GERS. 
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